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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Many choices in life are between alternatives that will be either immediately
rewarding or rewarding at some delayed point in time. When the values of two
commodities are equal the immediately rewarding one is obviously more valuable than
the one that is delayed. The immediately available reward may be enjoyed right now, and
one has nothing to gain by waiting. However, when the delayed reward is larger than the
immediate reward, one must choose between the two alternatives. For example, common
choices include whether to spend or invest one's money, to smoke or avoid health
problems, and to watch television or study in order to earn good grades. We make such
choices according to our perception of how rewarding the outcomes may be. Choices for
delayed, larger rewards are often referred to as self-control, while choices for immediate,
smaller rewards are seen as a sign of impulsivity.
It has been shown that as the delay to a reward increases, its subjective value
decreases (Killeen, 1972); therefore, the preference for a delayed reward is an interesting
one. Given the evidence that subjective value of delayed rewards decreases over time,
one might wonder what would ever motivate individuals to choose them. Some
individuals may choose delayed reinforcement, because it is worth more to them than the
more immediate alternative. In addition, delayed rewards may be chosen by behaviorally
2committing to them, which is possible by responding in a way that cane Is th availability
of the smaller, immediate reward (RacWin & Green L972). For example apr on who
has decided to quit drinking alcohol in favor of a healthier lifestyle may d cide to take a
different route home from work in order to avoid passing his or her fa orite bar. Surely,
the choice to commit to a larger payoff at some point in the futur can prove difficult.
The fact that individuals with substance-related disorders attempt to quit numerous ,times
without success is a testament to the challenge inherent in such choices.
Indeed, some individuals, such as problem drinkers, have exceptional difficulty
choosing delayed rewards (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998). Discounting occurs when a
larger, delayed reward decreases in value over time. The behavioral manifestation of
temporal discounting is that one chooses the smaller, more immediate reward rather than
larger, later one. This preference indicates that, subjectively, the value of the larger,
delayed reward is really only as much as the smaller, immediate reward. Many reasons
probably contribute to the fact that for some people future rewards are not valued enough
to be chosen. Possible explanations such as delayed rewards requiring too much ffort
and the uncertainty of obtaining delayed rewards will be discussed later in this paper.
Interestingly, a pattern ofchoosing immediate reinforcement often results in the
forfeiture of other valuable commodities that involve delay. Often, when individuals
choose more immediate alternatives, they are not necessarily forfeiting rewards for which
the only requirement is to wait. Rather, many delayed rewards require effort, faith, and
self-control. For example, larger, later rewards such as meaningful interpersonal
relationships do not suddenly appear after a certain period of time. They require an active
3pursuit, and the choice to obtain more immediatel reinforcing alt mati s such ,a those
obtained from a drug habit may be in direct conflict with other, delayed r ards.
A chronic pattern of choosing immediate rewards that result in losing great r
reinforcement in the long run can become problematic. Of particular inter st in 'the
current study is how individuals with depression often lose interest in their normal
activities, risking forfeiture of future rewards. This loss of interest, or anhedonia, may be
partially due to the decreased reinforcement value of many behaviors during depression.
For example, a depressed individual may have a choice between spending time with
friends, a large, delayed reinforcement, and sitting alone on the couch, a smaller, more
immediately rewarding alternative. The distinction made between which rewards are
large or small is likely to be subject to individual differences and learning history.
However, most behaviors may be conceptualized in terms of their costs versus benefits in
a temporally extended context. The examples used above may be analyzed accordingly.
Spending time with friends involves costs related primarily to emotional and temporal
investments. Individuals must spend enough time with each other to become familiar
with their histories, goals and hopes. Also, the process of getting to know someone
requires an emotional investment that requires the willingness to be vulnerable in
circumstances where acceptance from the other person may be uncertain. For some, these
costs may not outweigh the benefits of friendship, such as the comfort, fun, and intimacy
that it frequently offers. In other words, the reinforcement value of social behavior
decreases, while the choice resulting in social isolation provides escape from
vulnerability and emotional investment. However, the costs of this behavior may be
numerous. The social nature of human activity is pervasive. The costs associated with
4decreases social support may be detrimental to one s functioning in ork chool and
family relationships, as well as to one's personal health (Vahtera et a1. 2000' Orth-
Gomer, 2000). During depression there may develop a pattern in which spending time
with friends is never chosen, because its perceived reinfo.rcement value pr vents it from
being chosen.
However, it is important to note that depressed individuals do not lose interest in
all activities; in fact, some activities, such as substance abuse, are actually associated with
depression (Johnson, 1995). Substance abuse is a behavior that exemplifies the impulsive
choices that often exclude the receipt of larger, later rewards. So, it seems possible that
people who are depressed may prefer more immediate means of reinforcement and have
more difficulty making choices that result in delayed rewards.
The idea that depressed individuals might prefer more immediate reinforcement
was originally proposed by Rehm (1975). In his self-control theory ofdepression, he
suggested that depressed individuals attend more to immediate versus delayed outcomes
(Rehm, 1977). However, the results of studies examining this relationship have been
mixed.
Interestingly, the selective attention for immediate outcomes that Rehm (1977)
described in depressed individuals is comparable to descriptions of impulsive behaviors,
such as substance abuse. As it was mentioned earlier, a significant relationship between
problematic substance use and rates of temporal discounting has been established in the
literature. It is evident that depression and substance abuse have been commonly
characterized by a lack of self-control and a preference for immediate rewards, and there
is evidence of a significant correlational relationship between depression and substance
5abuse that does not even consider the role of temporal discounting. Accordingly, the goal
of the current study is to examine the interrelationship between depres ed mood,
substance use, and temporal discounting. It is hypothesized that self-reported depression
scores will predict individuals' discounting rates after statistically controlling for
substance use.
The remainder of the current paper will include a discussion of the phenomenon
in which the value of delayed reinforcement decreases over time, called temporal
discounting. In order to understand how temporal discounting fits into a broader
conceptual model of behavior, behavioral theories of choice will be discussed. The
remaining literature review will include evidence for the relationships of substance abuse
with both temporal discounting and depression. Also, theories of depression and studies
that examine directly its relationship to diseounting delayed" rewards will be presented.
CHAPTERTI
LITERATURE REVIEW
Temporal Discounting
As described hriefly in the previous section, individuals make many choices in life
between immediately reinforcing alternatives and alternatives that will be reinforcing at
some delayed point in time. Temporal discounting is representative of how the subjective
value of future rewards decreases over time (Myerson & Green, 1995). It has been
scientifically investigated and conceptualized as a common 'process by which people
evaluate future goals. In fact, philosophers and economists have long observed the
tendency for people to prefer more immediate gratification to delayed gratification, even
when the delayed reward is substantially larger (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992).
Basic learning theory supports the notion that more immediate consequences
foster learning more effectively. It follows logically that immediate rewards are more
meaningful and effective than delayed rewards. In addition, Hermstein's matching law
(1970) shows that preference for rewards is proportional to their rate and amount of
delivery and inversely proportional to their delay. Therefore, organisms will prefer
rewards that are large, fast, and immediate. Subsequent studies have shown that at one
point in time both rewards are valued equally, but before that point the delayed reward is
preferred, and after that point the smaller, more immediate one is preferred. Before
6
7preference rev,erses it is equal between the two rewar-ds and is characterized by
ambivalence. When preference reverses to the smaller reward. it is characteriz d by
impulsiveness (Rachlin & Raineri, 1992).
This preference reversal can be quantified by an equation called the hyperbolic
discount function. It estimates or predicts the extent to which the value ofdelayed
reinforcement decreases with time for any given individual. The following equation
represents the hyperbolic discount function (Ainslie, 1992; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin
Raineri, & Cross, 1991):
v = V/(1 +kD),
where v is the present, subjective or discounted value of the delayed reward, V is the
nominal value of the delayed reward. k is a constant indicative of the degree of
discounting, and D is the delay to the receipt ofthe reward. -In the psychological literature
the hyperbolic discount function has been contrasted to the exponential discount function.
The exponential discount function, preferred by economists, also represents temporal
discounting (Green et aI., 1994). The exponential function produces constant,
proportional decrements in reward value with equal increments in delay; therefore,
preference between the smaller and larger rewards remains constant over time. Rather
than producing proportional decrements with the addition of each equal delay the
hyperbolic function produces greater decrements in reward value at short delays than at
long delays. Therefore, when both rewards are very delayed the larger reward will be
preferred. However, as time passes the smaller reward becomes temporally closer, delays
to both rewards are smaller, and the larger reward is discounted so that preference
reverses to the smaller reward. The point at which individuals reverse their preference is
8indicative of their rate oftemporaJ discounting. The slope ofihe line determin this point
with steeper slopes representing higher rates of discounting which result in earHer
preference reversals.
It has been suggested that the steeply bowed hyperbolio discount function and its
resulting temporary preferences for more immediate rewards are fundamental prop rties
of motivation. It is common and often benefioial to get reinforced now rather than wait
for a delayed reward that may seem less likely to be delivered. However, frequent
preferences for smaller, more immediate rewards can result in self-defeating behavior,
such as substance abuse. Moreover, addictive behaviors have been noted as primary
examples of discounting the future (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). Examples of such
behavior include-drug consumption, gambling, and sexual offenses. The course of
addictive behaviors presents many choices for which the alternatives are the immediate
"fix" that the source of addiction offers or things such as going to work or spending an
evening at home with family. The latter alternatives will lead to later reinforcement such
as a paycheck and being trusted by one's family; however, these rewards decrease in
value as the individual becomes closer in time to the immediately reinforcing alternative.
For example, an individual addicted to heroin may decide he/she will quit after getting
high one last time. Then when he/she is in a situation where heroin is available again,
he/she gives in and professes that it will be after the next high that he/she will quit.
Of course, it has been shown that all people discount to a certain extent on
laboratory measures and presumably temporal discounting remains an individual
difference variable in the real world as well (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996). In the
laboratory temporal discounting has been measured with humans and lower Order
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animals by presenting a series of choice ituations in 01 in eith r re Jor hyp th tical
rewards. The deJa at which their prefi rence witches from smaller imm dia re ards
to larger, delayed rewards and vice versa is determined. Th point at which prefi r nc
reverses is used to determine individuals' k-values or discounting rates.
Individuals vary in their discounting rates, but their choices are subj ct to the
same contingencies of time, reinforcement availability, and reward value. In order to
illustrate how temporal discounting occurs in the real world, the next section will discuss
the broader concepts of behavioral choice theory. The primary factors influencing
behavioral choice the theoretical implications for countering temporal discounting, and
the evidence that substance abusers discount at higher rates will be included in the
following discussion.
Behavioral Theories of Choice
Behavioral theories of choice offer explanations for temporal discounting under
the assumption that behaviors are instances of a molar behavior-environment relation that
extends through time. It has been suggested that the causes of behavior are linked not
only to the immediate environmental context but also to general patterns of behavior
within a temporal context. This is important because in effecting behavioral change, one
must take into account that different behaviors may be exhibited as a result of one's
temporal relationship to the behavioral consequences. In addition, behavioral choice
theories developed from the evidence that behavior is controlled by the availability and
reinforcement ofalternative activities (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1998).
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The temporally extended context ofbeb.avior and th availability of alternati
behaviors are critical to the conceptualization of all behaviors' how Ner th following
discussion will focus on addictive behaviors to illustrate important theor tical cone pts.
In behavioral theories of choice, two general variables that influence addictive behavior
have been identified (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1998). First, environmental constraints on
access to the substance are critical to the development of abuse. Commodities including
substances, may be constrained by price, rate of consumption, availability, and delay to
their receipt. Second, the availability of alternative activities and the constraints on them
are also important to the development of abuse. For example, it has been demonstrated
that preference for alcohol consumption increases as the delay to alternative rewards
increased (Vuchinich et aI., 1987).
Drugs and alcohol are, in general, available at nominal prices, and those that are
legal are easily accessed. Some people can easily learn to consume them quickly and in
large amounts, which increases their value and fuels the cycle of addiction (Raineri &
Rachlin, 1993). Because of the appealing nature of immediate rewards, alternative
reinforcement is emerging as an important factor in breaking the cycle of addiction. In
fact, treatments designed for heroin and cocaine dependent individuals have implemented
contingency management programs that reinforce abstinence based upon the importance
of alternative reinforcement (Budney & Higgins, 1998). These treatments combine two
ways to counter temporal discounting in their approach. The program simultaneously
increases the reward value of delayed rewards by reinforcing abstinence with vouchers
and makes immediate rewards less attractive by implementing undesirable consequences
for choosing them. Another way discounting behavior may be countered is through self-
11
control (Rachlin & Green, 1972). [t has been shown that animals rna avord h ving to
choose between a smaller, immediat reward and alar er d layed T ard b b havjorally
committing to a path that leads to the larger, delayed reward. In a general ens rule-
governed behavior is a variant of self-control in that when on follows a rul h /she has
effectively avoided a situation that may haYe presented a difficult choice between maller,
sooner and larger, later rewards.
Indeed, self-control is an effective strategy to benefit in the long run from
choosing larger, delayed rewards; however, some people seem to exhibit very little self-
control. For these people, immediate rewards are chosen so often that problems develop
over time. Problems such as overeating, gambling, ch.eating, and substance abuse can be
conceptualized as developing <out of patterns of.discounting behavior. Research in the
field provides clear evidence that substance abusers discount at higher rates than normal
controls (e.g" Kirby et aI, 1999). However, it is unclear whether or not discounting
behavior is a cause or an effect of these behavior problems. The cognitive view would
suggest that discounting is a cause of such behavior patterns; however advocates for
behavioral choice theory have suggested that it is possible that the relationship is the
result of both biological and environmental factors (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).
Studies have mainly included alcohol and heroin users. Specifically, heavy
drinkers were found to discount more than light drinkers (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).
In addition, heroin addicts have been found to discount hypothetical monetary rewards at
higher rates than controls (Kirby et aI., 1999; Madden et aI., 1997; Petry et a1., 1998), and
at even higher rates for hypothetical heroin rewards (Kirby et al., 1999). Heroin addicts
have also been shown to discount real monetary rewards at twice the rate of controls
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(Kirby et al. 1999). Moreover drug users appear to have a dearea d a ility to
conceptualize the future than controls, which may be related to their increased likelihood
to engage in behaviors that are more immediately rewarding. A particularly salien '
example is that in a card-playing game, heroin addicts wer mor likely to make choice
resulting in greater immediate gains with delayed net losses rather than choices resulting
in overall net gains but frequent, small punishers and small rewards (Petry et al. 1998).
(
Substance Use and Major Depression
In addition to the empirical evidence suggesting a relationship between substance
use and temporal discounting, there are numerous studies that have revealed an
association between substance use and depression. The current hypothesis investigates the
relationship between depression and temporal discounting based upon their common
connection to substance use. The following review summarizes some of the evidence for
the relationship between depression and substance abu e.
According to the results of the Epidemiologic Catchment Area study, it is
estimated that there is a 27% rate of co-occurring substance dependence disorder with the
lifetime diagnosis of major depression (Regier et aI., 1990). In addition, it has been
suggested that the rate of co-morbidity for depressed mood and substance abuse is one of
the highest of any combination of diagnoses for adolescents and adults (Rohde et aI.,
1991). For example, Havassy and Ams (1998) reported in their study that substance
dependent subjects were over-represented among subjects with several other psychiatric
diagnoses, including major depression. Similarly, Lin et al. (1998) reported from a study
3in Taiwan that 43% of the patients in their sampl with majord pfi ion al had a
diagnosis of a substance use disorder.
The relationship between smoking and depres ionna been particularly well
documented. It appears to be reciprocal in that there are significant associations between
nicotine dependence and lifetime prevalence of major depression (Breslau et ai., 1991;
Kend1er et aI., 1993). For example, people with a history of major depression are
significantly more likely to smoke (Bresl'lu et al., 1993; Glassman & Covey, 1996) and
dependent smokers have been found to have more comorbid psychiatric disorders,
including other substance dependence and major depression (Breslau, 1995). In addition,
depressed symptoms are associated with being less likely to quit smoking (West et ai,
1989), and a history of depression increases the likelihood of experiencing depression
during withdrawal as well as worse withdrawal symptoms in general (Glassman & Covey,
1996). Interestingly, it has been suggested that depression and nicotine dependence may
share genetic or environmental predispositions (Breslau et al., 1993).
Other findings suggest that tobacco is only one of several legal substances
commonly used by depressed individuals. Lifetime use of caffeine, alcohol, and tobacco
was reported in over 80% of patients in a study in which the course and severity of
substance use in patients with a co-morbid substance-related disorder and major
depression was investigated (Westermeyer et aI., 1997). Illicit substances such as opioids
have been associated with depression as well. A longitudinal study of opioid/alcohol
users found that depression varied according to substance use status. Again, the
relationship seemed reciprocal in that increased use was associated with increased
depression and vice versa (Maddux et at, 1987). Indeed, the course of substance use
14
does not necessarily remain static over time. The co-morbid occurrence afmajor m Dtal
disorders and substance dependence appears to be re1ated to negative life circum tances
and dissatisfaction (Havassy & Arns, 1998). This is consisten· with behavioral choic ..
theory in that it has been argued that severe drinking episodes, or relapses, ar mo t
appropriately distinguished from less severe episodes by the changes in availability of
valuable non-drinking activities (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1996).
While the current study depends upon the relationship between 'substance abuse
and depression and upon the elegant conceptualization of substanc -related problems
according to behavioral choice theory, the hypothesis is concerned with depression alone.
In order to shift the focus to depression, the following section highlights several theories
of depression. Also, a more detailed discussi'on of how temporal discounting may relate
to depression will be presented.
Theories of Depression
According to the DSM-IV, major depression is characterized primarily by either
depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities (American
Psychological Association, 1994). There are several psychological theories on the
etiology of depression. The following review will include brief summaries of several
different models and is mostly based upon the overview provided by Sutker & Adams
(1993).
First, cognitive theory of depression, developed by Aaron T. Beck (1972),
suggests that individuals become depressed as a result of their negative views of
themselves, the world, and the future. It is suggested that depressed persons have
5distorted perceptions of their experiences that are manifest in their automatic thoughts.
Cognitive theory has not traditionally served as th basis for inv stigating di countin
behavior; however it has been suggest d that one possible Tea on p ople di COUIl~ future
rewards is that they do not expect them to actually com to fruition (petry et al. 19 ).
This type of thinking would seem to be consistent with the component of cognitiv til ory
that suggests a negative view of the future. ,
Second, self-control theory of depression focuses on; individuals' inability to
manage their behavior toward long-tenn goals: This model incorporates behavioral and
cognitive components in its explanation of how individuals alter the probability of a
response in the absence of immediate external supports. Rehm (1977) proposed that
deficits in self-monitoring behavior, self-evaluation, and self-reinforcement are all
potential sources of maladaptive self-control strategies. One tenet of this model that is
especially relevant to the current study is that depressed people attend more to immediate
rather than delayed consequences of their behavior. The research regarding this aspect of
the theory will be discussed later.
Finally, behavioral theories of depression emphasize insufficient reinforcement as
the root of depression. Peter Lewinsohn's (1974) suggests that susceptibility to
depression is related to social skills, the range of reinforcing events to a person and the
availability of the potential sources of reinforcement. He suggests that insufficient
reinforcement may result from the loss of external reinforcement that leads to the
extinction of certain behaviors. Depression, then, is proposed to result from the
generalization of behavioral extinction to other domains of a person's life. Klinger
(1993) discusses this phenomenon as it pertains to the depressive symptom in which there
16
is a loss of interest in most activities. Whit it is not mentioned in in er ] 9 th
behavioral theory of depression offers no explanation for behavior uch a ub tanc
abuse, that for some people tend to be associated with depression. However a criticism
of Lewinsohn's theory that Klinger does make is that ther is no xpLanation for why
behavioral extinction due to loss of reinforcement would generalize to other sourc s of
reinforcement. Consistent with behavioral choice theory, one pos ible explanation for
both the generalization of behavioral extinction and the seemingly inconsistent increas in
some behaviors is related to the extent to which various activities are constrained.
Specifically, certain factors unique to depression could effectively constrain the receipt of
many delayed rewards, resulting in a decrease in the behaviors they reinforce but an
increase in alternative, immediately reinforcing behaviors. The rationale for the current
study lies in the possibility that the extinction of some behaviors and increases in other
behaviors are related to a pattern of discounting behavior.
There are several possible factors that could influence the manifestation of
discounting behavior in depression. Investigation of the possible factors influencing
temporal discounting during depression is beyond the scope of this study. However,. their
presentation is critical to the development of the aforementioned rationale for the current
hypothesis. Further, it is important to illustrate a logical motivation for the study that is
beyond the shared associations of temporal discounting and depression with substance
abuse. A discussion of the possible factors that could influence discounting behavior in
the context of depression follows.
First, many sources of reinforcement may require too much effort for a depressed
individual to obtain (O'Hara & Rehm, 1982). As mentioned earlier, delayed rewards
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often require effort; however depression re ults in many different b havior becoming
more effortful, thereby making a larger number of alternativ entrain d. In his cas
activities such as sitting alone on the couch watching television or drinking or smoking
are simply easier than going out with friends and therefOl'e choen most of the time.
Another possible factor that could influence temporal discounting during depression i
that individuals could be uncertain about actually getting the reward. It has been
suggested that substance abusers may underestimate the probability of attaining delayed
rewards, because they are less able to envision the future (Petry et aI., 1998). Indeed, the
effects of substance use are, or at least may seem, more predictable than many delayed
alternatives. One last possible factor that could prevent depressed individuals from
choosing delayed rewards could be related to some kind of change in one's methods of
self-control. Earlier, it was discussed that individuals may exhibit self-control by
behaviorally committing to a delayed reward. There is evidence that the saliency of
memories is influenced by mood, with changes in mood being reta ed to reduced memory
for infonnation (Balch et aI., 1999). In the midst of depression, the memory required to
follow through on choices that bind one to delayed rewards may. therefore, b less salient.
However, the first step is to examine the relationship between temporal
discounting and depressed mood. It is hypothesized that a positive relationship between
rate of temporal discounting and level of depressed mood exists, such that rates of
temporal discounting may be predicted from one's self-reported depression. Previous
studies addressing this issue have emerged in response to Rehm's (1977) self-control
theory of depression. Early studies by Rehm and colleagues have produced equivocal
evidence to support the contention that depressed persons are more influenced by
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immediate versus delayed reinforcement (Rehm & Plakosh l' 75' O'Hara & R hm
1982). In an initial study, Rehm and Plakosh (1975) gave 92 undergraduates ameasWi '
of depression, the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List and a set of six choices to
determine their preference for immediate versus "delayed rewards. The 5i -item scale
required participants to rate their level of agreement with statements such as " 'I would
rather get $10 right now than have to wait a whole mQnth and get $30 then.'" The
participants were divided into three groups according to their depression scores, and a
significant negative correlation was found between depression scores and p.reference for
delay. Also, the correlation coefficients for each of the depressed groups differed
significantly, with the highest depression scorers having the lowest positive correlation
with preference for delay. Later, O'Hara and Rehm (1982) investigated the same concept
with real rewards rather than hypothetical ones. As part of the debriefing for a separate
study, they offered the participants the choice between receiving payment of the $20 they
were promised for participation immediately or the opportunity to am an additional
$2.50 for every two weeks that they delayed receipt up to 8 weeks The researchers failed
to find a significant relationship between participants' Beck Depression Inventory scores
and length of delay.
The two studies described above are problematic in their attempts to measure
discounting behavior. Specifically, the normative choice pattern that emerges when
rewards are delayed is not acknowledged or accounted for quantitatively. The definition
and quantitative representation of temporal discounting is that subjective value of delayed
rewards decreases over time. Therefore, the data collected in these studies may have been
more appropriately regarded as qualitative and analyzed accordingly.
1More recent!y Gaynor et a1. (1999) used a group of participants that a more
depressed than the ones in Rehrn's studies and employed hat they int nded to bam r
quantitatively rigorous methodology. Specifically, their methodology wa based upon the
research demonstrating the utility of the hyperbolic discount function (e.g., Mazur, 1987).
Gaynor et a1. (1999) used a computerized task that required participants to choose points
that would be exchanged for money ($.02/point) either the same day Qr in one week..
Participants' preferences were based upon 20 choice trials, however no k-values were
determined nor were any other parameters of discounting. Rather, participants were
dichotomized into two groups based on their number of impulsive choices (less than 10
versus more than 10). In their analyses, they found no relationship between depressed
mood and preference for immediate reinforcement. However, this study is also
problematic. The researchers acknowledge the methodology used to determine subjective
values of delayed rewards; however, they do not use it. Their methodology was
convoluted in that a mathematical conversion was required to determine how much each
choice was actually worth, and it failed to assess the subjective values participants were
assigning to the delayed rewards.
Two primary characteristics of the current study distinguish it from the previous
studies. First, in the current study a traditionally accepted, reliable quantitative measure
of temporal discounting is used. In addition, more sophisticated statistical analyses will
be employed to account for the relationship between depression and substance use when
testing the relationship between depression and temporal discounting.
The conclusions made from this study are relevant to current conceptualizations of
psychological problems, such as depression. If a relationship exists, it may provide
20
evidence that would support clinical approaches such as social skills training and
environmental changes, that are based upon the self-control and other behavior models of
depression. In addition, motivational approaches that provide a collaborative analysis of
the costs and benefits of behavioral alternatives (Miller & Rollnick, 1991) may be further
supported by evidence that reveals increased discounting of delayed rewards with
increased depression. Also, the results of this study may provide a logical basis for future
experimental studies addressing how behavioral patterns involving choices for substance
use evolve and co-occur with other problematic behaviors.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Participants
A total of 104 undergraduates at Oklahoma State University enrolled in either
Introductory Psychology or an upper division psychology course participated in the study.
Fifty-nine males and 45 females participated. The mean age was 20.07 years (SD= 3.27).
The majority of participants reported their marital and living statuses as single and living
with roommates. Students either received extra credit or fulfilled a required assignment
for the psychology class in which they were enrolled by participating in the present study.
Procedure
Participants were recruited in small groups of 10-20 each. They were asked to
report to a classroom on campus at the designated date and time in order to complete self-
report questionnaires pertaining to depression and substance use and to complete the
computerized Hypothetical Money Choice Task, which measures temporal discounting.
Participants' identities were kept anonymous.
21
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Materials
Participants completed four paper-and-pencil measures and one computerized
task. First, participants completed the Inventory to Diagnose Depression (100), a self-
report scale designed to be able to diagnose major depressive disorder (MOD) according
to the third and fourth editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM III; DSM
IV, American Psychological Association, 1980 & 1994). The IDD is unique in three
ways. It covers all possible symptoms for the diagnosis of MDD in its assessment; it
utilizes thresholds to determine the presence or absence of symptoms, which allows for
the severity of symptoms to be indicated in scoring; and it assesses for duration of
symptoms (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1986). The IDD has been researched for its quality as
a self-report measurement. The findings are summarized briefly in this report. It has
been found to have high test-retest reliability, with Cronbach's Alpha equal to .92, and
good internal consistency, with the median item-total Spearman rank-order correlation
equal to .47. The IDD has also been found to be a valid measure of depression, with a
Kappa coefficient of .66 (Zimmerman et aI., 1986; Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987). In
addition, it has been shown to be comparable to several other measures, such as clinician
diagnosis, median Kappa coefficient of .62 (Zimmerman et aI., 1986), the Diagnostic
Interview Scale, 15 =.49 (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987; 1988), and the Beck Depression
Inventory, r... =.90, p< .000 (Pace & Trapp, 1995). Finally, it is important to point out
that the TDD has been suggested as being particularly useful for research endeavors in that
it can serve as an inexpensive method to gather data on large samples quickly
(Zimmerman & Coryell, 1988).
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In addition to completing the measure on mood participan s complet d a bri f
questionnaire on their substance use. Use of caffeine alcohol and tobacco were as essed
so that they may be factored out as a source of variability contributing to tate of temporal
discounting. The measure was be an excerpt from a longer, comprehensive ass ssm ot of
substance use developed by Dana Britt (1996). No data on the validity or reliability of
this particular measure are available; however, it is only intended to measure the
frequency of individuals' substance use, not to diagnose any substance use disorder.
Participants also completed a measurement called the H¥J)othetical Money Choice
Task (HMCT), which was administered on a computer. The program, developed by Rudy
Vuchinich, is based on the task developed by Rachlin et a1. (1991). The task requires
participants to complete a series of hypothetical choices between various amounts of
money to be received at various delays. Each pair of hypothetical alternatives appears on
the screen by itself until the participant indicates a choice by pressing the designated keys
on the computer's keyboard.
The HMCT measures temporal discounting in that the choices participants make
determine how they subjectively value larger, later rewards. The hypothetical money
amounts are presented in both ascending and descending orders at each delay, and the
subjective values of the delayed rewards are determined by finding the average of the
crossover points from the ascending and descending presentations. The crossover points
are the points at which an individual switches to choosing the immediate reward from
choosing the delayed reward when the amounts are in ascending order and vice versa
when they are in descending order. The subjective values of the delayed rewards
determine the k-values in accordance with the hyperbolic discount function.
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The only difference this study presents from previous studies using the HMCT is
that administration will be in a group setting rather than individually. Traditionally
administering the computerized HMCT has required participants to complete the protocol
alone in the laboratory; however, the current study administered the task in a computer
lab where participants were able to complete the HMCT simultaneously. One
consideration regarding group administration is whether or not participants influenced
each other in their choices on the HMCT. However, this concern was minimal in that
participants have a limited amount oftime to indicate their choices on the computer,
therefore their full attention is required to discriminate the choices presented on each
screen.
Another paper-and-pencil measure intended to measure temporal discounting was
also administered. The Money Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) was developed by Kirby et
al. (1999), but its usefulness as a research tool has not yet been established. We
compared the k-values derived from each discounting measure and obtained ratings from
participants to compare the two measures on several dimensions. The final paper-and-
pencil measure consisted of four questions to be rated on a scale of I to 6 for each of the
tasks. The questions were: "In general, how easy/difficult was the task?"; "In general,
when you had to choose your preferred money amount, how easy/difficult was it?"; "In
general, how accurately did your choices reflect your true preferences?"; and "In general,
how easy/difficult was it to concentrate during the task?" These ratings were intended to
assess subjective differences between the two measures in a simple way so that the assets
and drawbacks of each could be compared for the purposes of future research.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
A total of 104 undergraduates at Oklahoma State University enrolled in either
Introductory Psychology or an upper division psychology course participated in the study.
Seven participants did not complete the computerized version of the Hypothetical Money
Choice Task (HMCT) due to technical problems and were omitted from the main
analyses. For the remaining participants, only statistically adequate HMCT k-values were
used. As described by Vuchinich &" Simpson (1998), the adequacy of the k parameter is
evaluated by the ratio of the estimate to its standard error. This ratio is distributed as at
ratio with (n-r) degrees of freedom, where n is the number ofdata points and r is the
number of parameters in the equation. In this case, n equals 8 (the number of delays
presented) and r is one. Ten participants were eliminated due to non-significant k-values.
A total of 87 participants with significant k-values were used in the remaining analyses.
IDD scores were obtained for all participants (N=104). The mean IDD score was
8.93, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of27. A subset of the sample
included only those participants who reported alcohol consumption and had significant k-
values. This sub-sample (N=53) was used in the regression analyses, and their mean IDD
score was 9.64, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of27.
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Systematic Evaluation of k-Values
It is important to note that prior to excluding participant with non-significant k-
values, preliminary examination of the data revealed irregular patterns in some
participants' choices. These irregularities were addressed systematically. Many
participants switched their preference from the immediate to the delayed reward value
more than once in a set, which influences the value of the computer-generated
equivalence point. For those participants (n=48) whose choices resulted in more than one
potential equivalence point, practical judgment was used to select the one crossover point
that most logically fit the rest of their choices. Crossover points that appeared to be the
result of inattention were identified by comparing the participants l questionable set of
choices to the remainder oftheir sets of choices. Also, empirical evidence for the nature
of the hyperbolic discount function dictates a prototype of choices that results in a distinct
slope when graphed. The resulting slope is visihly detectable when examining the
choices participants have made. Therefore, examination of the individuals' data and the
empirical evidence for prototypical choices guided the selection of one crossover point.
Determining k-Values
K-values were determined using a non-linear regression equation for both
computer-generated equivalence points (HMCT I) and the equi valence points derived
from clinical judgment (HMCT2). They were significantly correlated, r (46)= .94, p=.OO
and were not significantly different, r(47)=.909, p= .37. However, using the HMCT2
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equivalence points produced a gr ater number (n=87) of statistically significant k-valu_
than the HMCTI equivalence points (n=72).
Computerized HMCT Versus Paper-and-Pencil MCa
Several correlation analyses were conducted with HMCT2 k-values. One
component of the study was to use a new paper-and-pencil measure of temporal
discounting and compare it to the traditional HMCT task. The k-values that resulted from
the two measures were not significantly correlated, r (85), p<.05 nor were they
significantly different, l (86)=-.919, p=.36. Although the two measures of discounting did
not seem to measure the same construct, k-values derived from the paper-and-pencil
version were subjected to the same correlation and regression analyses as the HMCT2 k-
values. It is important to note, though, that the MCQ's validity and reliability have not
been sufficiently established. The results from the correlation and regression analyses are
presented in support of the conclusion that the MCQ does not appear to measure th same
construct as the HMCT. However, several aspects of both discounting measures were
compared in order to assess differences in participants' subjective appraisal of each.
Participants rated each measure for how easy/difficult it was, the ease/difficulty of
making choices, how accurately their choices reflected their true preferences, and how
easy/difficult it was to concentrate during the task. The two measures were rated
significantly different on the ease/difficulty of making choices, f (86)= 2.27, p<.OI,
on how accurately the choices reflected their true preferences, l (86)= 2.83, p<.Ol, and
on how easy/difficult it was to concentrate during the task, l (86)= 5.96, p<.Ol. The
paper-and-pencil version was rated as easier on ratings of ease/difficulty of making
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choices, and ease/difficulty to concentrate and as more accura e than the computerized
HMCT.
Correlational Analyses
Whether or not rates of temporal discounting were related to other variables such
as IOD scores and substance use, was central to the study's hypothesis. Therefore
several other correlational analyses were conducted as a precursor to the regression
analysis. The following analyses automatically omit participants who did not positively
endorse substance use. Rate of temporal discounting (HMCT2 k-values) was
significantly correlated with the number of beers, other drinks, and total drinks
participants reported having on an average day, r. (46)=.51, p<.O 1; r (45)=.42, p<.O 1; and
r. (42)=.62, p<.Ol, respectively. K-values from the MCQ were not significantly correlated
with any of the above drinking variables: number of beers, other drinks, and total drinks
participants reported having on an average day, r. (58)=.13, p=.33; r. (57)= -.07, p=.59;
and r. (54)=.05, p=.74, respectively. Rate oftemporal discounting (HMCT2 k-values) was
not significantly correlated with IDD scores, r. (85)=.12, p=.26, nor was it correlated with
any of the items in which participants reported their amount of alcohol consumption in a
typical week. K-values from the MCQ were also not significantly correlated with IDO
scores, r. (102)=.01, p=.89, nor were they correlated with any of the items in which
participants reported their amount of alcohol consumption in a typical week. The IOD
was significantly correlated with number of beers on an average day, r. (58) = .27, p<.05;
number of other drinks on an average day, r. (57)= .34, p<.05; total number of drinks on
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an average day, r. (54)=.44, p<.Ol; number of other drinks, in an average w ek r. (63 =.46
p<.O 1; and total number of drinks in an average eek r (59 =.40 p<.O 1.
Because rate of temporal discounting (HMCT2) was not significantly corr lated
with tobacco or caffeine use, a regression analysis was performed only with those
participants who reported alcohol use. It should be noted, though that a few data points
left blank by participants reporting alcohol use were filled in for th remaining analyses.
If a participant left a question regarding daily or weekly use of alcohol blank, a zero was
entered for them. If they had left a question regarding total alcohol use blank, their
previous answers were added accordingly. For example, if a participant left the questions
regarding their "daily beer consumption" and "daily other alcohol consumption" blank
but entered "0" for their total daily alcohol consumption, zeroes were entered for the first
two items. A total of twenty-four items out of 318 were filled in by the researcher.
Therefore, all participants who reported drinking alcohol and who had significant k-
values could be included in the final regression analysis.
Interaction Effect
In order to explore a potential interaction between drinking behavior and
depression scores, the HMCT2 data were graphed for visual inspection. Participants
were assigned to one of four groups. Median splits were conducted on IDD scores, total
number of daily drinks, and total number of weekly drinks. The median IDD score was 9,
median total daily drinks was 0, and median total weekly drinks was 6. For the graph
depicting total number of daily drinks (Figure 1), group 1 (n= 11) participants' IDD scores
were greater than or equal to 9 and total number of drinks was greater than O. Group 2
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(n=19) participants IDD scores were less than 9 and total numb r of drinks was equal to
O. Group 3 (n= 18) participants' roo scores were greater than or equal to 9 and total
number of drinks was equal to O. Group 4 (n=5) participants' IDD cores were tess than
9 and total number of drinks was greater than O. For the graph d picting total numb r of
weekly drinks (Figure 2), group 1 (n=l?) participants' IDD scores were greater than or
equal to 9 and total number of drinks was greater than or equal to 6. Group 2 (n=12)
participants' IDD scores were less than 9 and total number of drinks was less than 6.
Group (n=12) participants' IDD scores were greater than or equal to 9 and total number
of drinks was less than 6. Group 4 (n=12) participants' IDD scores were less than 9 and
total number of drinks was greater than or equal to 6.
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Figure 1. Groups 1,2,3, and 4 for Total Number of Drinks per Day,
Where the Dependent Variable Is the Temporal
Discounting Parameter, k.
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Figure 2. Groups 1,2,3, and 4 for Total Number of Drinks per
Week, Where the Dependent Variable Is the Temporal
Discounting Parameter, k.
Multiple Regression Analysis
Interaction effects were testing using a regression analysis. The k-value
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t lIt 1
representing rate of temporal discounting was the dependent variable. Drinking variables
(daily total drinking and weekly total drinking) and roo scores were centered first. Two
interaction variables were created using the centered data. The first interaction variable
multiplied daily total drinking by IDD score, and the second interaction variable
multiplied weekly total drinking by IDD score.
For the first regression analysis, the centered 100 scores and centered daily total
drinking scores were entered with the first interaction variable. The overall f. was
significant, f. (3,40), p<.Ol. The second regression analysis included the centered IDD
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scores and centered weekly total drinking scores. The overall F wa not significant in this
case. For K-values from the MCQ, the same regression analyses were conducted.
Neither were significant.
Close inspection of the data revealed that one of the participants in Group 1 of the
graph depicting total number of daily drinks had a k-value that was an outlier. Due to the
fact that the regression was significant with the total daily drinking scores, additional
analyses were conducted to detennine the outlier's influence. Diagnostics were run and
detennined that one participant was significantly influencing the data set. Therefore, that
participant was removed from the data set, and the regression analysis using the total
daily drinking and IDD scores was repeated. The overall E-value was no longer
significant when the outlier was removed.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
In the current study, depression scores were not found to be significantly
correlated with temporal discounting. However, given that alcohol consumption was
significantly correlated with both depression scores and temporal discounting, an
interaction effect was tested using regression analyses. Although the initial regression
analysis using total daily drinking scores and IDD scores was significant, it was found
that an outlier was exerting enough influence that the regression was no longer significant
after its removal.
It appears that the hypothesis that depressed mood would predict rates of temporal
discounting was not supported. While it initially appeared that daily alcohol consumption
might moderate the relationship between depressed mood and discounting, any effect
initially found in this study was due to the scores of an outlier who had much higher
drinking scores than the rest of the sample. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to examine
the role of depression on discounting behavior specifically in individuals who drink
heavily on a daily basis. However, the results of this study imply that no relationship
exists between depressed mood and temporal discounting for the vast majority of
individuals in this population.
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The implications of the current tudy may b compared and contrast d to pre ious
studies examining the relationship between depre ion and cb ic b ha iOL Pr vi, u
findings have been mixed. In comparison the results of this study ar consist nt with the
results of the most recent study that examined this issue. In contract whereas pr vious
studies have been flawed methodologically, a widely accepted methodology to measure
temporal discounting was employed in the current study. Therefore it can b reasonab y
concluded that there is no significant relationship between depressed mood and temporal
discounting.
As previously mentioned, one component of the current study was the comparison
of a shorter, paper-and pencil measure, th.e Money Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) with the
traditional, computerized Hypothetical Money Choice Task (HMCT). Because they were
neither significantly different nor significantly correlated, they did not appear to measure
the same construct. However, participants' subjective comparisons of the two measures
revealed that they found it easier to make choices and easier to concentrate while
completing the MCQ, and that they believed it more accurately reflected their true
preferences. The implication of this finding is that it may be important to develop shorter
measures of discounting that produce valid k-va.Jues and make it easier for participants to
make choices and concentrate.
Several problems with the design of the current study have implications for the
interpretations of findings. First, examination of individual data sets suggests there were
problems with attention during the administration of the HMCT. Individuals' choices
were not always consistent within sets, yet post-task questions that addressed task
difficulty did not reveal beliefs that the task was too challenging. One possible
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explanation for inattention during the task is that it was actuall not stimulating nough.
Task completion takes approximately 20-30 minutes and is repetitive in nature.
Therefore, participants' inconsistent responses could have been due to occasional
distraction due to boredom. Another possible explanation is related to tn potential
distractions inherent in a group setting administration. The task itselfis programmed to
beep when values on the soreen are about to chang or when a participant takes too long
to respond. The occasional beeps from others' computers may have caused participants
to look away from their own screens momentarily and lose concentration. It is concluded
that participants' data from the HMeT should be inspected carefully rather than relying
solely upon the computer-generated values, especially when the task was administered in
a group setting.
Another potential problem arises when the format of the substance use
questionnaire is considered. Because some participants gave answers that seemed
inconsistent, the clarity of the measure's wording must be questioned. Use of the words
"average" and "typical" may have led to participants' differential interpretation of the
questions posed to them. For example, some participants who gave answers for the
average number of beers/wine they drank per typical day may not actually drink on a
typical day, but rather, they may have "averaged" the number of drinks they consume in a
day by dividing the number they drink per week by 7 and reporting that. It will be
extremely important to use clearer, more specific measures of alcohol consumption in the
future in order to have more confidence in the validity of findings that emerge from those
data.
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Concerns also arise when the level of depre sion in this stud' J)' ampl are
considered. Overall, the sample of students was not very depres d with a median IDD
score of 9. Endorsing the highest items on every question of th IDD would r ult in a
score of 72. One must consider the sampling method when examining this concern,
Undergraduates from mostly Introduction Psychology courses participated on a voluntary
basis and were required to make a special trip to a building on campus in which no
undergraduate courses are taught. They also would have had to attend their psychology
course regularly in DIder to know about the research opportunity. It is possible that the
most depressed undergraduates do not attend class regularly nor have the desire or
motivation to make a special trip to an unfamiliar building on campus in order to
participate in a study. In the future, it may be more advantageous to sample populations
of individuals who have already been identified as experiencing depression.
Finally, although there was no significant interaction found in this study, it should
be noted that there were small, unequal numbers of participants in each of the four
drinkingfIDD categories. Other studies (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998) have identified
students with the highest and lowest drinking rates out of a large sample and used them
for their data collection. A similar approach could be taken by identifying individuals
with the highest and lowest levels of depression, as well as the highest and lowest levels
of drinking behavior. The goal would be to have equal or nearly equal numbers of
participants that exhibit high depression and drinking, low depression and drinking, high
depression and low drinking, and low depression and high drinking. Any significant
interactions found could, therefore, be interpreted confidently.
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To conclude, the results of this study revealed significant correlations between
drinking and depression scores as well as with temporal discounting. However, there
was no significant interaction effect with total daily drinks and IDD scores once the
outlier was removed. It appears that individuals' levels of depression cannot predict their
rate of temporal discounting. The correlational findings in this study supported
previously established relationships between substance use and depression, as well a .
alcohol use and temporal discounting. These previously established relationships wer
integral components to the formation of this study's hypothesis. Therefore, the data
supporting those relationships in the current study is believed to be valuable in and of
itself. In spite of the problems described above, the goals ofthe study were met and some
interesting findings were made.
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Substance Use Questionnaire ubject # _
4
Please check the appropriate answer orfill in the requested information.
Today's Date (Month/Day/Year) _
Your Age:
Sex: (1) __ Male
(2) __ Female
Which best describes your current marital status? (Check~ answer only)
(1)__ Single (Never Married)
(2) Married
(3)__ Divorced
(4)__ Widowed
(5)__ Separated
(6)__ Co-habitating
(7)__ Engaged
Which best describes your current living arrangement? (Check one answer only)
(1) Alone
{2) With parents or siblings
(3) With spouse/panner
(4) With roommate(s)/friend(s)
(5) Other (please specify, _
For the following items, ple-ase write a brief description of your parents' occupation.
Category descriptions provided below may be used, or exact job titles (e.g., elementary teacher,
owns small farm) may be provided_
Father's occupation: _
Mother's occupation: . _
(1) Executive, major professional
(2) Manager, minor professional
(3) Administrator, small business owner, semi-professional
(4) Clerical; Sales
(5) Skilled worker
(6) Semi-skilled worker
(7) Unskilled worker
(8) Unemployed
(9) Homemaker
(10) Retired
Using the numbers from the list below, indicate how far each of your parents went to school.
Father
-----
Mother
-----
(1) Graduate or professional training (degree obtained)
(2) Partial graduate or professional training
(3) College graduate (Bachelor's degree obtained)
(4) Partial college training (include techmcal training beyond high school; Associate's degree
obtained)
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(5) High school graduate (GEDi graduate of technical or trade school)
(6) Partial high school (10,h grade through part of 12'h grade)
(7) Partial junior high school (71h grade through 91h grade)
(8) Elementary School (6lh grade or less)
Caffeine
Ifyou have NEVER drank caffeinated beverages (currently OR in the past), please skip this section and proceed
to question 2a..
1a. Do you currently drink caffeinated beverages?
(e.g., coffee, tea, sodas, colas)
(1) Yes
(2) __ No
IfyoJ/ answered "yes" to question la, please skip questions Ib-Ie and proceed to question If
Ifyou answered "no" to question Ia (e.g. do not currently drink caffeinated beverages) but have in the
past, please answer thefollowing questions:
lb. At what age did you first begin to drink caffeinated beverages? years old
1c. At what age did you begin drinking caffeinated beverages
regularly, (e.g., almost daily)
1d. When you drank caffeinated beverages regularly, how many
beverages did you drink on an average day?
Ie. How long ago did you QUIT drinking caffeinated beverages?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) 6 months to 1 year
(3) 1-2 years
(4) more than 2 years
Please now proceed to question 2a..
1£. If you do drink caffeinated beverages daily or almost daily,
please record the number of cups, glasses, cans, etc.
you typically drink each day:
years old
_____ cups,
glasses, cans, etc.
__ cups, glasses, cans, etc.
19. How often do you drink caffeinated beverages? (Check one answer only)
(1) __ daily or almost daily
(2) __ 1-3 times a week
(3) __ 4-5 times a week
(4) __ 1-3 times a month
(5) __ only on occasions
(6) __ never or almost never
1h. At what age did you first begin drinking caffeinated beverages?
__ years old
li. At what age did you begin drinking caffeinated beverages regularly?
__ years old
Ij. How long have you drank caffeinated beverages regularly?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) __ 6 months to 1 year
(3) __ 1-2 years
(4) __ over 2 years
Cigarette Smoking
!fyou have NEVER smoked at all (currently or in the past), please proceed to question Ja .
2a. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (1)_Ye
(2)_No
Ifyou answered "yes" to question 2a, please skip questions 2b-2e and proceed to question 2/.
Ifyou answered ..no" to question 2a (e.g., do not currently smoke cigarettes) but have in the past, please answer
thefollowing questions:
2b. At what age did you first begin to smoke? __ years old
2c. At what age did you begin smoking
regularly, (e.g., almost daily)
2d. When you were a regular smoker, how many cigarettes
did you smoke on an average day?
2e. How long ago did you QUIT smoking?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) 6 months to 1 year
(3) 1-2 years
(4) more than 2 years
Please now proceed to question 3a.
__ years old
__ cigarettes
2f. If you do currently smoke cigarettes daily or almost daily, please
record the number of cigarettes you typically smoke each day:
___ cigarettes
2g. How often do you smoke cigarettes? (Check one answer only)
(I) daily or almost daily
(2) 1-3 times a week
(3) 4-5 times a week
(4) __ 1-3 times a month
(5) only on occasions
(6) never or almost never
2h. At what age did you first begin smoking?
years old
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2i. At what age did you begin smoking regularly?
__ years old
2j. How long have you been a regular smoker?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) __ 6 months to 1 year
(3) __ 1-2 years
(4) __ over 2 years
Smokeless Tobacco
Ifyou have NEVER been a smokeless tobacco user at all (currently OR in the past), please skip this section and
proceed to question 4a .
3a. Do you currently use smokeless tobacco? (1) _ Yes
(2) No
Ifyou answered "yes" to question 3a, please skip to questions 3b·3e and proceed to qttestion 3f.
Ifyou answered "no" to question 3a (e.g., do not currently use smokeless tobacco) but have in the past,
pLease answer thefollowing questions:
3b. At what age did you first begin to use smokeless
tobacco (dip)?
3c. At what age did you begin dipping
regularly, (e.g., almost daily)?
3d. When you were a regular dipper, how many dips
did you have on an average day?
3e. How long ago did you QUIT dipping?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) 6 months to 1 year
(3) 1·2 years
(4) more than 2 years
Please now proceed to question 4a.
___ years old
___ years old
___ dips
3f. If you do use smokeless tobacco daily or almost daily, please record the number of dips you typically
have each day: __ dips
3g. How often do you use smokeless tobacco? (Check one answer only)
(1) __ daily or almost daily
(2) __ 1·3 times a week
(3) __ 4-5 times a week
(4) __ 1-3 times a month
(5) __ only on occasions
(6) __ never or almost never
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3h. If you currently use smokeless tobacco, bow many cans do you use per day?
(1) __less than ~ a can
(2) __ between half a can and 1 can
(3) __ more than 1 can per day
Ji. If you currently use smokeless tobacco, approximately how long do you leave a dip in
your mouth?
minutes hours
3j. At what age did you first begin to use smokeless tobacco?
__ years old
3k. At what age did you begin using smokeless tobacco (dipping) regularly?
__ years old
31. How long have you been a regular smokeless tobacco user?
(1) __ less than 6 months
(2) __ 6 months to 1 year
(3) __ 1-2 years
(4) __ over 2 years
Alcohol
Ifyou have NEVER drank alcohol (currently OR in the past), please skip this section.
4a. Do you currently drink alcohol? (1) _ Yes
(2)_No
Ifyou answered ''yes'' to question 4a, please skip questions 4b·4e and proceed to question 4['
Ifyou answered "no" to question 4a (e.g., do not currently drink alcohol) but have in the past, please
answer the following questions:
4b. At what age did you first begin to drink alcohol?
4c. At what age did you begin drinking alcohol
regularly, (e.g. almost daily)?
4d. When you did drink alcohol regularly, how many drinks
did you have on an average day?
4e. How long ago did you QUIT using alcohol?
(1) less than 6 months
(2) 6 months to 1 year
__ years old
__ years old
drinks
(3) 1-2 years
(4) more than 2 years
4f. How many beers do you have ...
a) on an avera~e day?
b) in a typical week?
4g. How many other drinks (including wine, mixed drinks, etc.) do you have...
a) on an avera~e day?
b) in a typical week?
4h. If you do drink alcohol, please record the total number of drinks you typically drink. ..
a)__ drinks on an average day
b)__ drinks in an average week
4i. How often do you drink alcohol? (Check one answer only)
5'1
(1)__ daily or almost daily
(2)__ 1-3 times a week
(3)__ 4-5 times a week
(4)__ 1-3 times a month
(5)__ onty on occasions
(6)__ never or almost never
4j. At what age did you first begin drinking alcohol?
years old
4k. At what age did you begin drinking alcohol regularly?
__ years old
41. How long have you been drinking at this rate?
(1)__ less than 6 months
(2)__ 6 months to 1 year
(3)__ 1-2 years
(4)__ over 2 years
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HYPOTHETICAL MONEY CHOICE TASK
The example that follows illustrates the sets of choices that will appear on the computerized Hypothetical
Money Choice Task. Each row represents a set of alternatives from which to choose; however, the
computerized task presents each set separately on the screen.
IN 1 WeEK
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
RIGHT NOW IN 1 MONTHRIGHT NOW
$1.00
$5.00
$10.00
$20.00
$40.00
$60.00
$80.00
$100.00
$150.00
$200.00
$250.00
$300.00
$350.00
$400.00
$450.00
$500.00
$550.00
$600.00
$650.00
$700.00
$750.00
$800.00
$850.00
$900.00
$920.00
$940.00
$960.00
$980.00
$990.00
$1,000.00
IN 1 WEEK
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,00000
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
RIGHT NOW
$1.00000
$990.00
$980.00
$960.00
$940.00
$920.00
$900.00
$850.00
$800.00
$750.00
$700.00
$650.00
$600.00
$550.00
$500.00
$450.00
$400.00
$350.00
$300.00
$250.00
$200.00
$150.00
$100.00
$80.00
$60.00
$40.00
$20.00
$10.00
$5.00
$1.00
..t.
For example, these two values appear
on the computer screen together under the
labels highlighted at the top. Participants
will indicate their choices by pressing the
designated keys on the keyboard.
$1.00
$5.00
$10.00
$20.00
$40.00
$60.00
$80.00
$100.00
$150.00
$200.00
$250.00
$300.00
$350.00
$400.00
$450.00
$500.00
$550.00
$600.00
$650.00
$700.00
$750.00
$800.00
$850,00
$900,00
$920,00
$940.00
$960,00
$980,00
$990.00
$1,00000
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000,00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
$1,000.00
$1,000,00
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Money Choice Questionnaire
SUbject Number
For each of the next 27 choices, please circle which reward you would prefer:
the smaller reward today, or the larger reward in the specified number of days.
1. Would you prefer $54 today or $55 in 117 days?
2. Would you prefer $55 today or $75 in 61 days?
3. Would you prefer $19 today or $25 in 53 days?
4. Would you prefer $31 today or $85 in 7 days?
5. Would you prefer $14 today or $25 in 19 days?
6. Would you prefer $47 today or $50 in 160 days?
7. Would you prefer $15 today or $35 in 13 days?
8. Would you prefer $25 today or $60 in 14 days?
9. Would you prefer $78 today or $80 in 162 days?
10. Would you prefer $40 today or $55 in 62 days?
11. Would you prefer $11 today or $30 in 7 days?
12. Would you prefer $67 today or $75 in 119 days?
13. Would you prefer $34 today or $35 in 186 days?
14. Would you prefer $27 today or $50 in 21 days?
15. Would you prefer $69 today or $85 in 91 days?
16. Would you prefer $49 today or $60 in 89 days?
17. Would you prefer $80 today or $85 in 157 days?
18. Would you prefer $24 today or $35 in 29 days?
19. Would you prefer $33 today or $80 in 14 days?
20. Would you prefer $28 today or $30 in 179 days?
21. Would you prefer $34 today or $50 in 30 days?
22. Would you prefer $25 today or $30 in 80 days?
23. Would you prefer $41 today or $75 in 20 days?
24. Would you prefer $54 today or $60 in 111 days?
25. Would you prefer $54 today or $80 in 30 days?
26. Would you prefer $22 today or $25 in 136 days?
27 Would you prefer $20 today or $55 in 7 days?
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POST-TASK QUESTIONNAIRE
You have just completed two tasks, one computerized and one paper-and-pencil, in which you
were asked to choose between two money amounts. Please answer the following questions ab ut
those tasks. Note: Please indicate your answer for each question by circling one of the
numbers on the scale from 1 to 6.
For the COMPUTERIZED task:
1. In general, how easy/difficult was the task?
1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6
~~ ~~
easy difficult
2. In general, when you had to choose your preferred money amount, how easy/difficult
was it?
1----------2------------3------------4------------5------------6
ve~ ve~
easy difficult
3. In general, how accurately did your choices reflect your true preferences?
1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6
very not accurately
accurately at all
4. In general, how easy/difficult was it to concentrate during the task?
1------------2------------3------------4------------5-----------6
~~ w~
easy difficult
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For the PAPER-AND-PENCIL task:
1. In general. how easy/difficult was the task?
1------------2-----------3------------4------------5------------6
w~ w~
easy difficult
2. In general, when you had to choose your preferred money amount, how easy/difficult was
it?
1------------2------------3-----------4------------5------------6
w~ w~
easy difficult
3. In general, how accurately did your choices reflect your true preferences?
1------------2------- -----3------------4------------5------------6
ve~ not accurately
accurately at all
4. In general, how easy/difficult was it to concentrate during the task?
1------------2------------3------------4-----------5------------6
w~ w~
easy difficult
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